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In recent years there has been an increased awareness of the
possibility of planned weather modification. It is timely, therefore, for
lawyers to consider the problems they will face as a result of inten-
tional modification activities on any substantial scale. When one
considers that modification activities may alter or interfere with habits
and patterns of human activities that have become relatively fixed in
response to generally predictable patterns of weather over a period of
centuries, and that the effects of these activities might be felt by most
nations and cultures throughout the world, a preliminary understand-
ing of potential problems emerges. The very size and complexity of
,projected modification experiments indicate that present legal concepts
and institutions will be insufficient to provide adequate regulation. It
seems clear that not only must careful legal consideration be given to
this area, but also to the policy questions inhering in large-scale
technological alteration of natural weather process6s. Examination of
these questions will necessarily involve consideration of the direct
effects of modification on humins. Also included should be considera-
tion of the potential impact on phenomena of collateral importance to
human life. What will be the impact on plants and wildlife, on domestic
animals and aquifers? How will soil fertility, composition and rates
of erosion be affected? In short, the subject requires careful analysis
of potential large-scale ecological consequences.
The manner of stating a problem is crucial to its resolution.
Already a warning has been offered that this subject should not be
approached through the use of traditional legal concepts.' Obviously,
however, useful insight may be gained through the use of analogies
* BA., Beloit College, 1952; M.A., University of Chicago, 1957; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1958. The author is on the staff of the General Counsel of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA). The views expressed herein are those of the
author. They do not represent the views of NASA or any other agency.
1 H. Taubenfeld, Weather Modification Law, Controls, Operations, Report to the
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from relevant legal experience. Recognizing the hazards of too limited
a point of view, it is suggested that intentional modification of the
weather should, for the present at least, be viewed as an experimental
enterprise with potentially great value for mankind, but accompanied
by an equal potential for disaster. Even if modification proves to be,
on balance, a positive good, it might still cause serious harm to large
numbers of persons and interests. Successful modification efforts
might, for example, seriously impair natural scenery, wildlife con-
servation efforts, and the recreational use of land. These are values
that the law has not conspicuously favored in the past, and one of the
principal problems for the law raised by modification might be that of
finding the means of protecting both these values and the general
interest of society in a richly diverse environment, uncontaminated
and as free as possible from human interference.
The problem is one of determining the terms, if any, upon which
intentional weather modification activities and experimentation should
proceed. Obviously, the more information available concerning current
experimentation and its results, the better the response of the law can
be. But if the information is not available, the law will still have to
respond if the activities of the modifiers go forward. There is every
reason to believe that the plans of potential experimenters and modi-
fiers are ambitious.2 This article will examine selected legal and
policy questions raised by weather modification efforts. It will include
a consideration of statutory and case law developments. Particular
attention will be paid to the role of the federal government in the
support and control of weather modification because of the importance
of that support to such research, and because of the importance of
the role of the federal government in environmental affairs. The
article is limited to a consideration of intentional weather modifica-
tion. Inadvertent weather modification, such as that caused by auto-
mobile or aircraft emissions and stationary industrial sources, although
similar in nature to intentional weather modification, presents quite dis-
tinct legal and policy questions and is a proper subject for treatment
elsewhere.
1. ANTICIPATED HUMAN PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN
WEATHER MODIFICATION
There is at present considerable awareness of the necessity for
learning something from the past calamities inflicted upon society
Special Commission on Weather Modification of the National Science Foundation 1
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Taubenfeld Report].
2
 Approximately $11 million was spent by the federal government on weather
modification programs during fiscal year 1968. National Science Foundation, Weather
Modification 126 (Tenth Ann. Rep. 1968) [hereinafter dted as Tenth Annual Report].
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by the unanticipated effects of technology. Efforts have been made to
forecast difficulties that might be caused by weather modification. The
principal work in this field has been performed by the National Science
Foundation, which has issued or sponsored a number of reports con-
cerning the social implications of weather modification.' These reports,
containing the views of scientists, lawyers and political scientists, are
noteworthy attempts to anticipate a broad spectrum of problems likely
to be created by weather modification. The reports include considera-
tion of possible direct effects of modification on man himself, and in-
direct effects through action on flora and fauna. They are likely to be
influential documents in the development of weather modification law.
With regard to wildlife, it has been pointed out that in the United
States wildlife generally subsist on "islands" of land in which natural
conditions such as cover, forage and water are sufficient to support
certain levels of population. These "islands" are usually surrounded
by the habitat of man where the conditions of nature have been so
altered that only man, with artificial life-support techniques, can
survive. Ill-conceived modification programs could easily have serious
effects on large segments of wildlife living on small land areas, or areas
where living conditions are in delicate balance, because of the inability
of the animals to migrate from the area of weather change. 4
An ad hoc Weather Working Group of the Ecological Society of
America was consulted for background information in the course of one
of the principal studies.' The Working Group took the position that the
greatest positive argument advanced for weather modification is the
likelihood that it will produce an increase in rainfall on the drier parts
of the land surface. Weighing heavily on the negative side, however,
would be the likely increase in weeds, pests and pathogens. The species
that would be most harmed by these agents could not be identified at
the time of the report.° It is predicted, however, that changes that
would be produced in insular natural communities would almost con-
sistently be unfavorable, with a strong possibility of localized species
extinction present?
8 National Science Foundation, Human Dimensions of the Atmosphere (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Human Dimensions Report] is most relevant. Other reports of the
National Science Foundation also deal in part with potential human problems. See
Tenth Annual Report, supra note 2, at 5; Weather and Climate Modification, Report of
the Special Commission on Weather Modification to the National Science Foundation
80-97 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Special Commission Report]. A conference on eco-
nomic and social aspects of weather modification was sponsored by the Foundation in
1965. A report of the conference appears in Human Dimensions of Weather Modification
(W. Sewell ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Sewell Report].
4 See generally Special Commission Report, supra note 3, at 66-67.
5 Id. at 60.
6 Id. at 69.
7 Id. at 66-67.
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It was noted that there have been few direct efforts at ecological
prediction of weather modification's effects. From this, the obvious
conclusion of the need for research and a long-term monitoring of the
effects of modification was drawn. Most significant is the statement of
one observer that we have "no assurance that proposed uses of the
atmosphere will provide benefits in man's quality of living commen-
surate with the costs."
There is in these reports evidence of increased recognition of the
importance to man of biological diversity. Since animals and plants
can hardly speak for themselves, there is a need for courts to evolve
mechanisms that will enable concerned parties to provide for the
protection of endangered species. Historically, certain legal systems
have assigned legal rights and duties to animals? While this might
be regarded as an unimportant curiosity, or perhaps only as an ex-
pression of a type of human property interest in the animals, it is
interesting to speculate on the possibility that such a practice was
motivated by an appreciation of what we have only recently come
to understand as the science of ecology. Although there can be no
question of a return to any sort of primitive animism for modern
,man, it might be that there is something to be learned from primitive
societies' regard for nature. In this vein, De Jouvenal has ques-
tioned whether restoring personal status to rivers, something that
obtained in pagan times, might not promote their efficient and far-
sighted use." This is illustrative of one possible method of giving
recognition to interests that for one reason or another have often been
without effective legal defense in modern society. The attribution of
personal and legal status to animals, plants and natural featUres
such as rivers is, of course, a fiction that need not be resorted to if
courts and policy makers are willing and able to afford other protec-
tions against their meaningless destruction. 11
The conscious evolution of measures to secure such protection
might become necessary in the event weather modification or similar
technological measures miscarry. The 1966 report of the Special
Commission on Weather Modification concerning the technical prob-
lems of weather modification concedes that "uncertainty characterizes
most thinking about the changes in natural systems that are subject
8 Human Dimensions Report, supra note 3, at 50.
° See j..Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 42-45 (2d ed. 1921).
to B. de Jouvenal, The Stewardship of the Earth, appearing in The Fitness of Man's
Environment 109 (1967).
11 A method is suggested by the action of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in attributing standing in the challenge of a power license to a non-profit wildlife
association. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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to modification.” 12 To emphasize this, the report notes that this un-
certainty specifically' relates to possible consequences for the quality
of water, plants, animals and human factors as well." Moreover, this
uncertainty is particularly evident with regard to the human factors.
Although research on human response to natural weather has been con-
ducted by geographers, with principal emphasis on the effect of weather
on agriculture, nevertheless our general knowledge of the sensitivity
of human activity to natural weather is described as "imprecise and
incomplete.'
Some attempts have been made to consider factors comprising an
optimum climate for man. The geographer Huntington maintained that
a climate having as its chief characteristic a moderate temperature and
frequent passing of alternating pressure centers was best for human
development:
[A] relatively high degree of storminess and a relatively long
duration of the season of cyclonic storms have apparently
been characteristic of the places where civilization has risen
to high levels both in the past and at present. Hence such
places experience much variability, a condition which later
work has led me to believe highly beneficial."
Huntington's work and theories of climatic determinism have
been criticized or refuted in part. 1° Nevertheless, these critical views
themselves would seem to emphasize the apparent complexity of
possible human response to weather; and the lack of any appreciable
understanding of possible effects of weather on human behavior.
One factor that does seem clear is the unlikelihood that the
question of human response to weather can be truly understood by the
examination of only segregated weather phenomena and possible
human response. Rather, it seems necessary that consideration be
given to the examination of human response as a continuum over
extended periods of time."
A small but very valuable part of the effort to anticipate human
response is in the attempt to project the possible problems for primi-
tive or tribal societies. A decision to engage in weather modification by
12 Special Commission Report, supra note 3, at 84.
13 Id.
14 Human Dimensions Report, supra note 3, at 35.
13 E. Huntington, Civilization and Climate 12 (3rd ed. 1948).
10 See generally Sewell Report, supra note 3, at 399-440.
17 As one authority has observed:
The most pressing problems of humanity ... involve relationships, communica-
tions, changes of trends, in other words, situations in which systems must be
studied as a whole in all the complexity of their interactions.
R. Dubos, So Human an Animal 27 (1968).
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and for a modern industrialized society might seem acceptable because
of the relative ease with which many in such a society can invoke two of
the three traditional responses to weather: adaptation, adjustment and
movement. These responses ate regarded by some commentators as
traditional." Adaptation refers to various physiological responses.
Adjustment suggests the creation of an artificial environment through
shelter construction, development of new strains of hardier plants,
the wearing of clothing or the rescheduling of activity. The primitive
society cannot, of course, adjust or move with anything approaching
the degree of ease available to the modern society.
For an example of some of the probable difficulties tribal societies
might experience with weather modification programs, one need look
no further than some of the remaining Indian cultures in the United
States. It seems clear that even slight changes in rainfall would have
disastrous effects on the present life of tribes such as the Navajo in
the Southwest whose crops and technology are closely dependent upon
ten inches of rain annually.' The Zuni, who live immediately to the
south of the Navajo, are not as physically dependent upon the weather
because of their partial withdrawal from agricultural pursuits to silver-
smithing and wage work in nearby towns. The Zuni, however, have
retained an elaborate cosmology, based heavily upon weather, which
serves important and contemporary functions of integration and politi-
cal contro1.2°
There is an importance attached to nature and weather in some
tribal societies that far surpasses comparable attitudes in industrial
society. One report on the Hopi personality indicates that it includes
a protective attitude toward life in any of its manifestations; human,
animal or plant.21 Also, ceremonial performances specifically oriented
toward weather, such as the rainmaking dance or rituals to cure the
sick, are important features in some cultures in the Southwest. 22
Although the loss of such values as Indian cosmology and person-
ality traits might be regarded by some as at most a subject for com-
pensation,28 and not as requiring the cessation or avoidance of experi-
mentation with the weather, nevertheless at the center of numerous
18 Human Dimensions Report, supra note 3, at 29.
19 Sewell Report, supra note 3, at 379.
20 Id. at 383-85.
21
 H. Driver, Indians of North America 436 (2d ed. 1969).
22 Id. at 435.
2° Article I of the Navajo treaty of June 1, 1868, for example, requires the United
States to arrest persons injuring the person or property of any Indian and to reimburse
the injured Indian. 15 Stat. 667 (1868). Acts of Congress can supersede Indian treaties.
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 1 (11 Wall. 616) (1870); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665
(1912). Navajo treaties, however, were confirmed by Congress in 1950. 25 U.S.C. § 631
(1964).
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contemporary social, political and legal conflicts is the feeling that
technology and industrial activity are developing in an unrestrained
manner, and at the expense of many of the very amenities that give
life its diversity and interest. It would seem, therefore, that weather
modification might lead to irreversible changes in ways of life for
American tribal societies. It is questionable whether any amount of
indemnification could truly compensate for this. In the case of tribal
societies, such changes would be readily apparent at an early stage,
but there is no reason to assume that a modern industrial society
would prove to be immune from similar change in due time.
In the case of complaints from foreign countries regarding
weather modification, the matter would likely be one subject only to
political resolution in the absence of international law or agreement,
particularly if the complaint is based upon major changes." Of course,
some experiments conducted by nationals of continental states such
as the Soviet Union or the United States, while seemingly of reasonable
scale to such experimenters, might assume much greater significance
to many smaller states and thereby be more likely to provide grounds
for serious complaint. Thus, hurricane diversion in the Caribbean area
might deprive large sections of Mexico of needed moisture."
Whereas the possibilities of the destruction of or serious harm to
plant and animal species are strong, no such forecast is projected for
mankind itself. However, existing primitive or tribal cultures may
indeed be seriously affected, and there is general uncertainty about the
possible effects of modification on the totality of civilization. It is this
uncertainty that promises severe difficulty for policy makers should
modification go forward on a broad scale. For the present, we must
be satisfied with attempts to speculate in a very general way on the
importance to man of weather, including its dramatic extremes. The
Special Commission on Weather Modification asserts that no presently
conceivable program can eliminate the extremes of a winter blizzard
or the flash of summer lightning. Nevertheless, it "raises the question
of how far the human spirit is enriched by the uncertainty and wonder
and exhilaration that come with the restless, violent movements of
the atmosphere."26 The most depressing summation of where weather
modification might lead us in human terms is by the zoologist, Marston
Bates:
24 Cf. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Some International Implications of Weather
Modification Activities, 23 International Organization 808, 829 (1969).
22 The Taubenfelds suggest such diversion could necessitate irrigation, retraining or
population transfer. Id. at 827.
20
 Special Commission Report, supra note 3, at 86. The implication of raising this
question is, of course, that while what the Commission says may be true with respect to
the limitations of present technology, the history of science reveals that the possibility
of an all-pervasive global control system cannot be excluded.
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I see again Brave New World looming ahead. With our
growing population I suppose we must control rather than
adapt, and I suppose our power gives us ownership of the
planet, perhaps to destroy it. But if and when we do gain
control over weather and climate—purposive and not acci-
dental as with carbon dioxide—I hope we can leave some
weather reservations where natural storms can beat upon
natural vegetation. But there may not be any natural vege-
tation then."
This represents the attitude that society is helpless before science
and technology .28 While this could prove to be the case eventually,
there is no reason to concede without a struggle, and that struggle
must have as its goal a reaffirmation of the principle that science and
technology are the servants of mankind, and not the reverse.
II. CURRENT LEGISLATION CONCERNING WEATHER MODIFICATION
The potential consequences of intentional weather modification
are world-wide. Even on the basis of the present knowledge of ex-
perimentation this is clear. It is equally clear that in due course the
necessity for international agreement regarding this subject will
appear2° For the present, however, it would seem that the develop-
ment of federal law would necessarily be the preferred method for the
adoption of standards. 8° However, the states have already taken the
lead in the adoption of legislation with respect to weather modifica-
tion, and attention must be given to these efforts.
A total of twenty-nine states have legislated in one way or another
concerning the subject of weather modification." Some states have
27 Sewell Report, supra note 3, at 407.
28 The concept of technological determinism has been most recently associated with
the name of the French sociologist Jacques Ellul. A portion of the foreword to an
American edition of one of Ellul's best-known works might have been directed toward
the quotation from Bates excerpted in the text. Ellul observed: "Freedom is not static
but dynamic; not a vested interest, but a prize continually to be won. The moment man
stops and resigns himself, he becomes subject to determinism." J. Ellul, The Techno-
logical Society xxxiii (1964).
29 See generally Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control: Some International
Legal Implications. 55 Calif. L. Rev. 493 (1967).
80
 Authority for federal action might be found in the Commerce Clause or in the
war-making authority. Bases for federal action and questions of the exclusivity of federal
authority and state police power were ably discussed in an article several years ago.
See Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspects of Weather Modification, 1958 Ins. L,J. 314 (1958).
It is also suggested that the authority of the federal government to act in this area
might arise out of the obviously international character of such experimentation. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
81
 See Oppenheimer, note 30 supra, and Taubenfeld Report, note 1 supra. See also
Davis, State Regulation of Weather Modification, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 35, 52 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Davis].
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claimed sovereign rights in the moisture in the clouds and others have
established licensing requirements for weather modifiers 8 2 Thus, it
seems that several states have acquired a degree of experience with
weather modification problems not yet matched on the federal level.
Moreover, it is evident that because of the great geographical diversity
of the United States, and the consequent variation in natural condi-
tions, individual state governments may for some time to come be in a
position to reflect more accurately than the federal government the
wishes of their citizens with respect to weather modification. Of course,
individual state responses might not reflect the wishes of organized
science or groups of scientists. These individuals and groups might
be expected to seek uniform federal regulation of weather modification
as a step toward modification experimentation and operation over
large areas. It is possible, therefore, that a state-federal conflict over
authority to regulate weather modification would reflect a more funda-
mental conflict between the weather modifiers and those who would
oppose such activities.
Considerable positive interest in modification activities has been
indicated in states containing arid regions. In some instances this
has resulted in explicit legislative support for modification. Wyoming,-
claiming sovereign rights to the use of local moisture, has further
stated through its legislature that "although little is known regarding
artificial weather modification . .. ," research and experimentation
"shall be encouraged."" Texas has legislatively excluded the plea of
ultrahazardous activity, thereby relieving modifiers of that burden, in
actions against modification operations conducted pursuant to a license
granted by the state.84 In California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Dakota and Washington there have been either instances of
state-supported modification research, or research in state educational
institutions which are supported by outside financing."
Pennsylvania and Maryland, on the other hand, where moisture
is not in as short supply, have adopted or permitted prohibitions
against modification activities. Maryland has prohibited it for a period
32 Louisiana has claimed "its sovereign right to the use for the best interest of its
people of the moisture contained in the clouds and atmosphere within its state boun-
daries." La. Rev. Stat. tit. 37, § 2201 (1964). New Mexico "claims the right to all
moisture in the atmosphere which would fall so as to become a part of the natural
streams or percolated water of New Mexico . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-37-3 (1968).
Similar claims have been made by: North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code fi 2-07-01 (Supp.
1969); South Dakota, S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 38-9-2 (1967); and Wyoming, Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 9-267 (1957). For a discussion of state licensing requirements see Davis,
supra note 31, at 53, 57-58.
83 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-267(b) (1957).
34 Texas Rev. Civ. Stat, art. 8280-12, § 18 (Supp. 1970).
85 Taubenfeld Report, supra note 1, at 39-43.
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ending September 1, 19700 Pennsylvania had permitted local pro-
hibition by resolution of county commissioners. While the authority
for this has been terminated, Pennsylvania seems to have retained a
prohibition against attempts to suppress lightning." At present, Penn-
sylvania concedes legislatively that the public interest requires "sci-
entific experimentation in the field of artificial nucleation, and that
scientific efforts to develop and increase natural precipitation . . . be
encouraged . . . . "88 It is possible that continuing caution in Pennsyl-
vania's attitude toward weather modification may be reflected in its
legislative prohibition against the use of nucleating agents in concen-
trations dangerous to man." This is an apparent reference to the fact
that silver iodide, frequently used in seeding activities for the purpose
of providing an artificial nucleus for precipitation, is a poison."
Against this background of state legislative activity, the record of
federal legislation is lean indeed. The National Science Foundation
had authority to carry out a program of study, research and evaluation
in the field of weather modification until 1968, at which time its
authority was repealed. 41 One reason offered for this repeal was the
recognition that the ramifications of weather modification went beyond
the purely scientific .°
It has been argued that federal legislation should now preempt
the field of weather modification's However, this should not neces-
sarily be the case, at least for the foreseeable future. The differing
approaches by state legislatures, which vary from outright prohibition
to the encouragement of weather modification, suggest that an attempt
at preemption by Congress would be strongly resisted by many inter-
ests. Also, the action of Congress in the repeal of the innocuous
authority of the National Science Foundation for the study of weather
modification might indicate a caution and uncertainty in the face of a
potentially powerful technology whose consequences are still largely
unknown.
80 Md. Code Ann. art. 66, § 110A (Supp. 1969).
87 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, §§ 1115(b), 1117. (Supp. 1970).
88 Id. § 1101.
89 Id. 9 1111(c).
40 M. Gleeson, R. Gosselin & H. Hodge, Clinical Taxicology of Commercial Prod-
ucts (2d ed. 1963).
41 Act of July 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-407, § 11(1), 82 Stat. 365.
42 S. Rep. No. 1137, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 2658
(1968).
4° See Taubenfeld Report, supra note 1, at 7; Weather Modification and the Law
141 (Taubenfeld ed. 1968). Explicit preemption by Congress might be possible. See,
e.g., The United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1964). Such an action, however,
might not overcome state regulation based upon the police power, as that relating to
air and water pollution problems. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960) (city smoke abatement code upheld as applied to federally licensed
shipping in interstate commerce).
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Of course, there is need for a degree of uniformity with regard
to the question of controling weather modification, and this need will
probably become more pressing as time passes. While the Congress
might seem the obvious institution in which this need for control will
be resolved, there are no clear signs of the shape of possible future
legislation emanating from this source. Also, while vesting regulation
exclusively in the states is subject to many criticisms, the states are
at least in a position to be more responsive to and perceptive of the
human difficulties created by weather modification within their juris-
dictions.
THE CASE LAW OF WEATHER MODIFICATION
Although the litigation of individual suits in weather modification
matters might not be a primary means of control over these activities,
it is important not to overlook the fact that courts are certain to be a
leading forum in which conflicts arising from modification will be aired
and settled. Lawyers can reasonably hope that this process will tend
to cause the articulation and resolution of competing values in such a
way as to assist in the development of policy by legislators and ad-
ministrators.
A potential recurring difficulty in weather modification litigation
concerns questions of proof. At least seven cases dealing with modifica-
tion have been decided in American courts." Two decisions were based
on failures of proof. Samples v. Irving P. Krick, Inc.45 arose out of
actions by landowners who claimed damages from a cloudburst and
flood that occurred coincident with defendant's seeding operations.
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was negligent in seeding
under the existing weather conditions. A jury gave verdicts for the
defendant and the court issued no opinion. In Pennsylvania Natural
Weather Ass'n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass'n," the court
denied a request for an injunction against a hail suppression program
because the plaintiff failed to show more than a possibility of harm.
Because of the primitive state of knowledge and technology con-
cerning the efforts of weather modifiers, it is unlikely that future
plaintiffs in similar cases will be able to surmount the difficulties of
proof which faced the plaintiffs in these cases. One obvious issue that
arises, then, is that of the possible application of the doctrine of strict
liability on the theory that weather modification is an ultrahazardous
activity. If this theory were accepted with regard to weather modifi-
cation activities, a plaintiff would be freed of the necessity of showing
44 The cases are discussed or summarized in Taubenfeld Report, supra note 1, 50-70,
and in Sewell Report, supra note 3, at 281-83. See Davis, supra nate 31, at 4344.
45 Civil Nos. 6212, 6223, and 6224 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
46 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 749 (C.F. Fulton County 1968).
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fault on the part of the modifier, a particularly difficult matter when
dealing with a technology in its infancy. A plaintiff would merely have
to show a causal connection between the loss suffered and the risk
caused by the modifier.
The application of this doctrine was avoided in the case of Adams
v. California.'" It is noteworthy that the defense in the Adams case
was able to prove that the rainmaking activities of the modifier, al-
though presumably successful, did not contribute to a disastrous
flood which caused plaintiff's loss. It was shown that rain presumably
caused by defendant's activities was totally impounded, in a lake that
did not overflow. Thus, it would seem that even if the doctrine of strict
liability had applied, there would have been no causal relationship be-
tween the induced rain and the damage. In the view of Prosser" and the
American Law Institute" this would seem to be an adequate defense.
In the context of the Adams case, at least, the application of the doc-
trine of strict liability probably would not have led to an unfair burden
on the modifier.
The novelty of the technology and the limited fund of knowl-
edge concerning weather and its modification, viewed in light of its
great potential for harm, lead one to conclude that this is an area in
which the theory of strict liability should indeed apply.
Roscoe Pound has provided a valuable historical perspective in
which to place this question. He noted that toward the end of the
19th century certain departures from previously-held fundamental
ideas in jurisprudence became manifest, one of which was an increas-
ing tendency to find liability without fault. 5° He indicated that an
important motive behind this change in attitude was an evolving
higher valuation of persons over property. Thus, in weather modifica-
tion litigation, to insist on a strict burden of proof for the plaintiff
seems regressive in nature.
Of course, it might be claimed in some cases that the conflict is
properly viewed as being between personal rights and science, and
that the latter is a value deserving of higher consideration by the law.
This seems to be implicit in the position that has been advanced by
the Special Commission on Weather Modification.' Nevertheless, in-
dividuals likely to be injured by weather modification activities are
not likely to be well represented in the decision making which will
47 No. 10112 (Super. Ct. Sutter County, Cal., April 6, 1964).
48 W. Prosser, Law of Torts 532-33 (3d ed. 1964).
49 Restatement of Torts § 519 (1968).
50 I R. Pound, Jurisprudence 445-46 (1959).
81 See, e.g., the recommendation of the Special Commission that federally supported
experimenters should be indemnified and immunized from interference by state and local
government. Special Commission Report, supra note 3, at III.
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ultimately lead to state or federal sponsorship, or to the licensing of
weather modification. If the courts do not recognize weather modifi-
cation activities as being ultrahazardous, this might deprive such
persons of all reasonable hope of influence over important decisions
affecting their own lives and property.
Of course, modification activities are imaginable in a variety of
circumstances. A licensed experiment by competent researchers in
remote, sparsely populated areas would be quite different from a
commercial operation under contract to a single business in a heavily
populated urban area. It is quite conceivable that the rationale of
Rylands v. Fletchern would apply the principle of strict liability to
the latter situation and exempt the former. The difference is, of course,
between the usual and normal and the exceptional and abnormal."
The first reported weather modification case is Slutsky v. City of
New York." This involved a conflict between a resort owner's desire
for clear weather and the city's desire, or demand, for rain for its
reservoirs. The plaintiff resort owner sought an injunction against
the city's modification attempts, claiming that the experiments would
cause inundations, and that the actual or threatened rainfall would
harm the resort business. The court applied a somewhat crude benefit
analysis and entered upon a comparison of claimed benefits. The
resort owner's business interest was compared with the need of the
city and its millions of residents for water and, when put this way,
the result was not in doubt. The court did not purport to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis, and thus did not attempt to consider the total
costs of the modification attempts.
The court stated that experts for the city had shown that the
modification experiments had reached a stage where it might reason-
ably be expected that rainfall would be induced and controlled. It
then proceeded to the question of balancing interests:
This court must balance the conflicting interests between a
remote possibility of inconvenience to plaintiff's resort and
its guests with the problem of maintaining and supplying the
inhabitants of the City of New York . . . with an adequate
supply of . . . water."
In dicta, the court referred to plaintiff's lack of "vested property
rights in the clouds or the moisture therein" as a defect in his suit."
But what was the warrant for the manipulation of the weather by the
52
 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
153
 W. Prosser, supra note 48, at 520.
64 97 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
55
 Id. at 240.
56
 Id. at 239.
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city? The court did not amplify. The court's conclusion appears to
flow simply from its perception of the extreme need of the city for
water.
The Slutsky case might serve as an illustration of the limitations
of any system in providing for the settlement of disputes involving a
comparatively small number of interests or interests of limited scope.
It is possible to agree with the suggestion that the plaintiff had no
vested property interests in the state of natural weather without
agreeing with the result. It was the city, after all, that was seeking
to modify a natural process, and it is doubtful whether the proponents
of such change should inevitably prevail upon a showing that those
challenging the proposal lack property interests in the process in
question. There is a general interest in seeing that ill-founded inter-
ventions with natural processes are not approved routinely. Of course,
the regulation of such matters would seem to be something for institu-
tions other than the courts. But, in the absence of conflicting statute
or regulation, it would seem appropriate for courts to consider private
litigants as representative of the public interest to the extent that such
litigants can show, in addition to a private cause of action, that a
proposed intervention is not in the best interests of society)"
Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones" involved a dispute
between ranchers and farmers over a hail suppression seeding pro-
gram sponsored by the farmers. The ranchers claimed that the
program suppressed rain as well as hail and thereby damaged their
lands. The Supreme Court of Texas sustained the trial judge's action
in granting an injunction pendente lite against the program as not
being an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas had substantially sustained
the trial court earlier, and issued a thoughtful opinion in the matter,
after concluding that there was ample evidence in expert and lay
testimony that the actions of the defendants did dissipate clouds over
the property of the plaintiffs, and that temporary restraint against .
such actions was appropriate. The court appeared to suggest that a
natural right theory might apply: "We believe that under our system
of government the landowner is entitled to such precipitation as
Nature deigns to bestow."as
67 This proposal is suggestive of action in the public interest by a private litigant
against an illegal act by a government agency where the litigant is acting in the capacity
of a "private attorney general." Under this theory, advanced by Frank, J., in Associated
Indus. v. Ickes, 135 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), the private litigant must act pursuant to
an authorizing statute.
BS 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W.2d 417 (1959).
59 Southwest Research, Inc. v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940, 945 (1958). Companion
case, Southwest Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (1958). Bath aff'd sub
nom., Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W.2d 417 (1959).
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Thus, the opinion of the Texas court, while contrary to the New
York court in Slutsky, also avoids any competing benefit or cost-bene-
fit analysis. It is based upon a traditional common law approach, the
finding of a right attached to land with no clear suggestion that the
right is anything but absolute. The court did emphasize, however,
that it was dealing with a purely private dispute, and that there was
no regulation or state or federal agency involved. Quite conceivably,
therefore, the reasoning of the court might have differed had it been
presented with some public interest expressed through legislation or
regulation.
The opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County in
the Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n case, alluded to above, is
the most comprehensive judicial treatment of some of the principal
issues involved in weather modification. Essentially, the court denied
a requested injunction against a program of commercial hail suppres-
sion on the dual grounds that no more than a mere possibility of harm
from the activities of the defendants was shown, and that the plaintiff
had an adequate remedy at law. The former ground was based upon
Pennsylvania law to the effect that the drastic remedy of the injunc-
tion would not be granted in the face of a mere possibility of harm.
There must be clear and convincing evidence of an intended or threat-
ened injury which must be practically certain."
Despite this result, the court included in its opinion a discussion
of theories of ownership and use of land, air and clouds. With regard
to the plaintiff's land title, the court seemed to suggest the natural
right theory that land ownership includes as one of its natural inci-
dents the right to receive weather in its natural forms. The court then
argued that if this were so, it must necessarily follow that such a
landowner has some right in the clouds or to the moisture in the
clouds. The court criticized the conclusion of the Slutsky case that the
resort owner had no such rights. Following this discussion, the court
proceeded to a consideration of the Aeronautical Code of Pennsyl-
vania,6' of leading federal litigation over the question of air rights,"
and of Pennsylvania air pollution litigation," to suggest various
theories such as a qualified ad coeleum doctrine and simple negli-
gence upon which protection of the plaintiff's interest could be based.
Then, the court concluded:
We are of the opinion that clouds and the moisture in the
clouds, like air and sunshine, are part of space and are corn-
co See W.
 Prosser, supra note 48, at 624.
31 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 1460 et seq. (1963).
02 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp.,
84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
a Hack v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 Ald 87 (1966).
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mon property belonging to everyone who will benefit from
what occurs naturally in those clouds. There could be just as
much injury or harm from weather modification activities as
there could be from air and water pollution activities. We
hold specifically that every landowner has a property right
in the clouds and the water in them. No individual has the
right to determine for himself what his needs are and pro-
duce those needs by artificial means to the prejudice and
detriment of his neighbors."
The court then qualified this with the statement that beneficial
effects from weather modification are possible, and that modification
in the public interest and under the direction and control of govern-
ment authority should be permitted.
Thus, in Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n is found the sug-
gestion of a theory of common property rights in natural weather
processes susceptible to individual action for protection. The court's
view is in sharp contrast with that espoused by the New York court
in Slutsky, where the presumed lack of individual property interests
in weather was important in the plaintiff's failure to prevail.
The broader issue of whether the earth and its atmosphere can
withstand still further interventions by man and his technology is a
question that does not seem to have been explicitly or consciously
faced by the courts in these cases except through the suggestion that
this might be a subject for legislation. But the present day has, as
one of its "felt necessities,"63 a need for the understanding and control
of technology, particularly the side effects that hitherto do not seem
to have concerned the progenitors of technical developments. In pur-
suit of this, courts should have brought before them in weather modi-
fication disputes the fullest possible exposition of evidence concerning
the long-term interests of society and the long-term effects of modifica-
tion efforts.
W. COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN
WEATHER MODIFICATION
The cases discussed above involve a conflict between those
opposed to weather modification and those involved in commercial
64 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 749, 759-60 {C.P. Fulton County 1968).
65 The reference is, of course, to Justice Holmes' famous opening of The Common
Law. It bears repetition here:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevelant moral and political theories, institutions of public
policy avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed,
0. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1923).
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activities. They do not raise the question of conflict between natural
weather advocates and those who favor scientific experiments in the
field. Large-scale government-supported modification attempts, such
as hurricane diversion," are more likely to be viewed as scientific
experiments, and many future conflicts will involve government-
supported experiments such as these. Disputes over this type of
experiment will undoubtedly call into question basic scientific values,
such as the claims to freedom of experimentation and of scientific in-
quiry.
It was observed in the preceding section that the traditional
methods of dispute settlement between two parties involving only local
considerations would not necessarily lead to the best basis of settle-
ment from the societal point of view. This section will examine those
competing policy considerations in weather modification research and
operations that might be overlooked in typical litigation.
What should be the attitude of the law and the policy makers
toward weather modification? Some of the literature discussing the
legal and other problems involved in weather modification appears to
embody the point of view that one of the more important tasks for
lawyers in this field is to work for the creation of a receptive legal
climate for the work of the modifiers and the experimenters. Thus, a
1967 conference on the subject of weather modification, which in-
cluded both scientists and lawyers, expressed a concern over the
dangers of inhibition of experimentation by courts and legislatures
even though the conference also appeared to recognize that weather
experimentation was substantially unpredictable in its results." The
possibility that weather modification might alter the broad psycho-
logical outlook of some people was advanced at this conference, but
it was agreed that there should be no inhibiting legislation enacted on
this account."
Possibly the most explicit and far-reaching expression that the
law should favor this field of research is found in the report of the
Special Commission on Weather Modification." The Special Com-
mission stated in part:
6° Project Stormfury was established in 1962 as a federal government project for
hurricane research and modification. L. Rattan, Harvesting the Clouds: Advances in
Weather Modification 114 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rattan].
67
 Weather Modification and the Law (Taubenfeld ed. 1968).
68
 Id. Generally, of course, the law would require a physical invasion to redress
injuries through damages. However, in recent decades, American courts have shown some
willingness to find liability for mental stress where conditions of extreme outrage are
attributable to the defendant's conduct. See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.
1964) and Restatement of Torts § 46 (1965).
60
 Weather and Climate Modification: Report of the Special Commission on
Weather Modification to the National Science Foundation (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Special Commission Report].
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Fulfillment of the objectives of the program recommended in
this report requires that research have a very high priority.
This means that State and local legal rules cannot be per-
mitted to interfere with research objectives. Interference can
be of two kinds. First, the local rules may impose liability
for injuries caused by research projects; the threat of lia-
bility may act as a deterrent to researchers. . . ."
Then, with reference to the possibility of injunctions, the report
asserted:
Provision should be made to ensure that all properly con-
ducted experiments including those conducted by contract or
grant should be immune to local interference."
There is also some indication that the scientific community, or
a portion of it, is inclined to scoff at those opposed to weather modi-
fication. The legal report to the Special Commission on Weather
Modification described groups hostile to researchers, experimenters
and commercial operators as "irate uninformed local publics." 72 The
legal report was based upon questionnaires sent to state governments,
research and experimental organizations, commercial operators and
federal agencies. No private groups of citizens which may have been
opposed to weather modification appear to have been included in this
survey, and, other than the fact that this seems to have been the
opinion of numerous respondents, no substantial basis for the descrip-
tion of the opposition as "irate and uninformed" appears."
The opposing view to that of total freedom for experimentation
is that weather modification operations and experiments in the field
should be brought to a halt." Presumably this viewpoint is held by
some members of the "irate publics." Before concluding that every-
78 Id. at 109.
71 Id. at 110.
72
 H. Taubenfeld, Weather Modification Law, Controls, Operations, Report to the
Special Commission on Weather Modification of the National Science Foundation 5-6
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Taubenfeld Report].
78
 It seems quite possible that groups hostile to the commercial operators and the
experimenters are well informed as to the modification attempts in the sense that there
is an appreciation of the unpredictability of the technology being used. Thus, the hostile
groups may have very sound reasons for being irate.
74 Oppenheimer has suggested a spectrum across which possible legal attitudes
toward weather modification might be arranged. At one extreme, a land owner would
have complete natural rights and modification would be totally prohibited. At the
opposite extreme, weather would be treated as oil, gas or wild animals, subject to private
appropriation, with liability only for negligence or nuisance. A middle ground would
balance the safety of society with the advance of science, and permit a reasonable in-
vasion of airspace for modification activities. Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspects of Weather
Modification, 1958 Ins. L.J. 314, 320-21 (1958).
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one opposed to weather modification is an unlettered rustic, it is neces-
sary to note that the World Meteorological Organization has expressed
the view that climate modification should not be attempted at the
present time." Also, a working group of the Ecological Society of
America has expressed a very skeptical view concerning the net effects
of weather modification, and stated that large-scale operations, from
a biological point of view, should not be undertaken with the present
state of knowledge."
With these points of view in mind, some of the arguments made
by the proponents of modification experimentation, such as the appar-
ent suggested abrogation by the Special Commission on Weather
Modification of all state tort law, do give one pause. The phrase
"freedom for experimentation" has been advanced as part of a request
for federal indemnification. 77 Also, it is argued that "weather research
needs the laboratory of nature . . . . "78 It is with respect to this point
that a fundamental distinction exists between much of modification
research and most laboratory science. The modifier's laboratory of
nature is mankind's planet, and no amount of rhetoric concerning
freedom of scientific inquiry can change this. The fact is that severe
injury, damage and fatalities involving persons and property unre-
lated to the experiment are possible as a result of experimentation in
this particular laboratory.
If there is a general right of experimentation, the right, as with
all similar rights to engage in useful activity, should be qualified and
made generally subject to the law. To exempt an entire category of
human activity, such as research or experimentation, from the tradi-
tional concepts of liability for tortious acts, would be in this instance
an extraordinary step without any clear showing of necessity or
utility."
75 "Before undertaking an experiment on large-scale weather modification, the
possible and desirable consequences must be carefully evaluated, and satisfactory inter-
national arrangements must be reached." World Meteorological Organization Third
Report on the Advancement of Atmospheric Sciences and Their Application in the
Light of Developments in Outer Space (1964).
TO Special Commission Report, supra note 69, at 69. To this, the meteorologist
Batten asserts that the need for greater amounts of fresh water is likely to overwhelm
the need for better understanding. See Battan, supra note 66, at 134.
77 See, e.g., Special Commission Report, supra note 69, at 95: "Freedom for Ex-
perimentation: In order to permit field experiments . . . it is essential to provide for
indemnification of investigators .. . ."
78 Taubenfeld Report, supra note 72, at 5. However, much can apparently be ac-
complished by way of computer simulation. As the size of the modification simulation
increases, however, computer capacity becomes a limiting factor. It is conceivable that
future generation computers will be able to simulate global atmospheric systems. See
generally National Science Foundation, Weather Modification 91-101 (Tenth Ann. Rep.
1968) [hereinafter cited as Tenth Annual Report].
79 One of the reforms of Solon in ancient Athens was to enable larger numbers of
persons to have recourse against those who caused them injury. By this, it was said,
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By analogy, medical experimentation is a distinct and equally
important area of scientific investigation. Although the goals, methods
and scale of operations of weather and medical experimentation differ
greatly, the two fields have important similarities, and it is possible
that the experience gained in the field of medical experimentation
might be of value to the present study. Of immediate interest is the
fact that medical experimentation also involves the possibility of
direct harm to the person and yet co-exists with the law, albeit some-
what uncomfortably." Here, too, there seems to be a measure of
disagreement, in this case by segments of the medical profession, with
the legal restrictions on experimentation. One physician has put it as
follows: "It has been most unwise to try to extend the principle of
`a government of laws, not men' into areas of such great ethical
subtlety as clinical investigation." 81
 This is most blunt and disturbing
in its full implications. It is illustrative, however, of where the ex-
treme freedom of experimentation position might carry us in at least
one area of science and law.
In weather modification, as well as in medical experimentation,
there is an implied claim by the experimenters of a right to engage
in an activity that may prove injurious to property or human life. Of
course, the principal justification for these activities will normally be
that their results may be of extreme value to society and will outweigh
any short-term or individual injury caused in experimental stages. In
medical experimentation, a principal method of striking a proper
balance and of securing a subject who will undergo the risk of injury
or death for the benefit of society is by securing an "informed con-
sent" to the experiment.' In the modification of the weather, an
approach that has been adopted by some states is to grant a form of
consent to experiments through licensing mechanisms by the govern-
ment. This is not individual consent, however, and the licensing action
by a state should not constitute a defense in liability actions by in-
jured persons against weather modifiers.'
In many commonplace activities, as well as in medical experimen-
tation, society approves of or permits activities to continue even
though their costs, including personal injuries and death, may be quite
he intended "to accustom the citizens, like members of the same body, to resent and
be sensible of one another's injuries." Plutarch's Lives 108 (Modern Library ed.).
80 See generally Preface, 98 Daedalus No. 2 (1969).
81
 Jaffe, Law as a System of Control, 98 Daedalus 406 (1969).
82 Freund adds that for liability-free medical experimentation, there must also be
the exercise of due care in the experiment, and the experiment itself must be sound in
the sense that the possible results must not be disproportionate to the known risks.
Freund, Legal Frameworks for Human Experimentation, 98 Daedalus 321 (1969).
83
 Legislation in Washington with regard to licensing of modification operations
explicitly disclaims any intent to affect private liability questions. Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
{ 43.37.190 (1970).
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substantial. One commentator cites the continued use of grade cross-
ings, automobiles and aircraft as examples." Such examples as the
use of automobiles traditionally have at least four conditions attached
to them, however, which for one reason or another make them toler-
able to society: (1) they are necessary for some positive value;
(2) the persons threatened by their continued operation are virtually
unidentifiable in advance; (3) the cost of avoiding adverse effects
would be quite high and, accordingly, is regarded by society as un-
acceptable;" and (4) it is possible for individuals to take reasonable
steps to avoid some danger by conscious safe driving habits, avoidance
of flights in bad weather, and similar action.
In the case of weather modification, consideration of the first
factor, the existence of positive value, would involve seeking possible
alternatives to weather modification such as improved forecasting,
irrigation, saline water purification, development of drought-resistant
crops, improved forest-fire protection systems, and improved con-
struction or design in areas historically threatened by violent weather.
Further research on the effects of present day modification activities
and their direct and indirect consequences might provide information
that would remove the second condition, the anonimity of potential
victims, as a factor tending to favor the public toleration of modifica-
tion: that is, persons or groups potentially threatened might have
more reasonable bases in fact to regard themselves as threatened than
at present. With regard to the third factor, the prohibitive cost of
avoiding harmful effects, it would seem that now, during the infancy
of modification technology, the costs of avoiding the adverse effects of
weather modification are lowest. It is only after large investments are
made in a technology, such as the automobile or the jet engine, that
change becomes expensive. The fourth factor, the ability of individ-
uals to avoid the dangers of weather modification, is, of course, a
function of many variables. For the present, however, it should be
noted that the ability of persons to avoid adverse effects would seem
to diminish as the change in weather becomes more permanent. Also,
as suggested above in connection with the discussion of tribal societies,
the ability to avoid the adverse impacts of weather modification will
vary greatly between individuals and groups because of the varying
degrees of dependence on, or sensitivity to, natural weather.
All of the foregoing considerations might, with the passage of
time and further research, provide the focus for the more refined
development of major legal and political issues regarding weather
84
 Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 Daedalus 387
(1969).
86 Id. at 389-90.
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modification operations and research. The reasonableness of a re-
searcher's claim to the use of the natural laboratory of nature would
be subject to serious question, for example, if it could be shown that
an improvement in the accuracy of weather forecasts could achieve
the goals of a particular modification experiment and at a smaller
cost. Similarly, if plaintiffs seeking injunctions against precipitation
enhancement experiments or operations were able to show with reason-
able certainty that the defendant's action would deprive the plain-
tiff's land of moisture, the likelihood of favorable court action would
be increased. Similarly, there is an increasing public awareness of the
formerly hidden costs to society of such things as automobile pollution
and personal injuries caused by poor design. This awareness might
translate eventually into an insistence that such costs be borne by the
users and producers of the particular instrumentality. In the case of
weather modification, this would, of course, increase the burden on
modifiers of showing the net value of their activity.
On the scale of local weather modification, the issues may often
seem to be clearly perceptible. Positive values such as fog suppression
around airports and highways, tornado and lightning suppression in
general, hurricane diversion, and rainfall enhancement or suppression
may be quite obvious depending upon the .locale to be benefited and
the presence or absence of harmful indirect effects. Similarly, poten-
tial negative effects may also be obvious. In the case of fog suppres-
sion, there may be crop or forest land nearby with a dependence upon
the moisturizing effect of fog. This, of course, would lead to a clear
conflict between the adjacent landowners, and might suggest one
further reason for some form of rational weather modification plan-
ning in the United States. If we discard or fail to adopt a natural
rights theory of weather under which the land owner is entitled to the
receipt of weather untouched by man-made interference, any substi-
tute theory would have to include some attempt at defining the best
use of land," which could significantly affect the question of whether
or not to modify the weather. In the case of hurricane diversion there
may be a similar conflict between the avoidance of destruction by a
seacoast area spared the hurricane's path, and an inland area depen-
dent upon the moisture that is normally delivered to it by seasonal
hurricanes or their overland remnants.
These are the most obvious issues. The best resolution of these
86 For example, under the British Town & Country Planning Act, 1947 (1 & 2 Eliz.
2 c. 16) anyone proposing "development," defined as including the carrying out of any
"operations in, on or over or under land," must obtain planning permission. Conceivably,
disputes concerning modification could be resolved by a referral of the proposed use to
the plan which would be periodically renewed. See generally R. Megarry & H. Wade,
The Law of Real Property 951-52 (1957).
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conflicts will remain unclear as long as the question of secondary
effects is unsettled. The fact that potential local conflicts might be
readily subject to resolution through agreement, litigation, or even
well-intentioned legislation or administrative action, does not in the
present state of knowledge give any assurance that the interests of
society in avoiding harmful interference with natural weather pro-
cesses will be protected. 87
V. METHODS AND STANDARDS OF CONTROL
Weather is vital to mankind, and there is a common interest in
seeing that it is not subjected to unnecessary interference by man. It
should not be subject to unilateral appropriation or interference by
any interest. Where intentional modification or experimentation
occurs, every precaution should be taken to avoid interference with
the proper claims of others to the use of natural weather.
There is a considerable tradition in positive law and in the writ-
ings of commentators that provides well-defined conceptions which
'might prove relevant in seeking the above objectives. Weather would
seem to fall within that category of substances that legal systems have
traditionally recognized as not being subject to appropriation as pri-
vate property. A concept of common property, or of substances not
subject to appropriation, appears in Roman law." The principle of
permitting common use of such a substance, without its impairment,
is also found in the common law and is described in Blackstone, as
follows:
But, after all, there are some few things, which, notwith-
standing the general introduction and continuance of prop-
erty, must still unavoidably remain in common; being such
wherein nothing but usufructuary property is capable of
being had; . . . Such (among others) are the elements of
light, air and water... . All these things . . . every man has
a right to enjoy without disturbance; but if they escape
from his custody, or he voluntarily abandons the use of
87 Hail suppression has been described as an area of modification activities in which
everyone wins and no one is hurt. The basis for this contention is that a properly con-
ducted experiment on suppression merely eliminates the hail but not the precipitation.
Weather Modification and the Law 205 (Taubenfeld ed. 1968). However, nearly all
hail suppression in the United States is attempted with massive doses of silver iodide.
Tenth Annual Report, supra note 78, at 42. Thus, while local agreement that hail sup-
pression is desirable might easily be achieved, the long-term interests of society might
be ignored through repeated release of chemical pollutants into the atmosphere, a rather
typical occurrence in the history of environmental pollution.
88
 The air, running water and the sea were, by the law of nature, considered com-
mon to mankind, and res communes. Justinian, Institutes 90 (Sandars 9th ed. 1898); R.
Sohm, The Institutes, A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law
303 (3d ed. 1907).
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them, they return to the common stock, and any man else
has an equal right to seize and enjoy them afterwards."
To apply a common resource concept to natural weather processes
would not be rigid adherence to archaic tradition, but a common
sense recognition of the importance of weather to mankind.
A. A Concept of Public Trust
Pound found, with regard to natural resources, a historical
tendency to shift from a viewpoint of res communes and res nullius
to that of res publicae. In this shift, he saw an increased tendency on
the part of the law to protect natural resources and to recognize that
in an increasingly crowded world, acts which tend to destroy or
waste natural resources should be restrained." Thus, common assets
such as wildlife and running water are regarded as not falling within
a total legal void, but as being assets of the state or of society, in-
capable of being subject to private appropriation, except under such
regulation which protects the social interests in their use and con-•
sumption.9'
The above thinking might find contemporary expression with
regard to governmental weather programs in a public trust concept.
Under this concept, the government is held to a high standard of
trust in its administration of certain of its property. In the leading
case of Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois," the Supreme Court held void
a grant by the Illinois legislature of certain submerged lands under
the navigable waters of Lake Michigan. The Court found that the
lands were held in trust for the people of the state, and that the
grant to a railroad was in violation thereof."
Of course, a state government must be capable of divesting title
to much of the property that comes into its possession, and the case
presents, among other problems, the difficulty of determining what
category of property is subject to the trust concept. It is apparent
from a reading of the case that the Court could not accept the magni-
tude of the property interest that the state sought to alienate. Great
emphasis was laid by the Court on the size and importance of the
submerged lands under Chicago harbor which would have passed into
private hands. The trust, it was suggested, was governmental in
89 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 480 (Lewis ed. 1900).
9° 3 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 305 (1959).
in 1 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 449 (1959).
92 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
98 Id. at 452. The case and the subsequent history of the public trust doctrine are
discussed in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
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nature, and the lands subject to the trust thus could not be per-
manently alienated."
A concept of public trust as applicable to the federal government
has never been enunciated. Thus, the doctrine of the Illinois Central
case does not, in the present view, apply to the federal government.
While the public trust concept was touched upon by the Supreme
Court in the tidelands oil controversy of the post-World War II
period, the result was to avoid the concept of a binding public trust.
The tidelands controversy involved a contest between the federal
and certain state governments over the ownership and control of
minerals found in coastal waters. In the opinions reported in connec-
tion with this controversy, the Supreme Court suggested that the
public trust theory would not be held to be applicable to the federal
government in a way that would permit judicial review of actions by
the Congress." Nevertheless, a trust of sorts was said to exist. In
United States v. California," the Court held that the federal govern-
ment, with reference to the three-mile marginal belt of sea in question,
had "paramount rights in and power over that belt, and incident to
which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water
area, including oil.""
In reaching this conclusion the Court uttered two concepts of
probable application to natural weather processes. It said that the
political claim of the executive to the three-mile belt was binding on
the Court," and that the question of control and protection against
harm to this particular resource was inherently an international
question, thus necessitating resolution of the state-federal conflict in
favor of the federal government." In answer to a claim by the state
that federal representatives had waived any rights the federal govern-
ment may have had, the Court stated that, even assuming govern-
ment agencies had been negligent, a waiver was impossible because
the interests in the resources were held "in trust for all the people"
by the government.1°°
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act of
, 10195- .
,1	 by which it ceded the marginal three-mile belt and its natural
resources to the coastal states. Here was presented a possible test of
" 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
96 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) ; United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). For a critical dis-
cussion of these cases, see E. Bartley, the Tidelands Oil Controversy (1953).
06 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
07 Id. at 38-39.
	 ,
08 Id. at 34.
DO Id. at 35.
100 Id. at 40.
101 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1964).
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a federal public trust theory. Alabama and Rhode Island duly filed
motions in the Supreme Court for leave to file their complaints to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act, but the Court denied the
motions per curiam with a reference to Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2
of the Constitution.'"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Reed elaborated on a possible
public trust theory, but indicated his agreement with the apparent
view of the Court that the authority of Congress with regard to
"other Property belonging to the United States" is supreme: "The
United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in
one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a
cestui que trust."'"
Neither Justice Black nor Justice Douglas in separate dissents
were willing to make so sweeping a declaration, and both raised the
question of what the Court would do were the Congress to "sell" the
Mississippi or the Columbia or one of the other great navigable
rivers of the nation.'" It is apparent that the Court was influenced
in its decision not to hear the challenge to the disposal of the sub-
merged lands by the fact that an Act of Congress was at issue, and
by the language of the Constitution which, in the Court's view,
creates an enclave for congressional supremacy. If this is a correct
view of the Court's action, it might leave the Executive's execution
of its programs open to challenge on a trust theory where no challenge
to legislation is involved.'"
The peculiar nature of weather would seem to indicate that
concepts of trust and proprietary interest do not present likely bases
for challenges to some federal actions concerning the weather. Refer-
ence to tort law will more likely be made by litigants seeking redress
against the effects of federal support of weather modification. Never-
theless, the rhetoric of trust law is often used with regard to govern-
mental administration of natural resources, and it is not without
value to examine policy questions of weather modification in connec-
tion with a public trust theory.
Under what conditions could the licensing or financial support
of experimentation be regarded as constituting a violation of trust or
102
 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272-73 (1954). The clause in question reads:
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United
States.
108 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954).
104
 Id. at 280, 282.
105
 Conceivably, a particular trust could be implied by the terms of a statute. Cf.
Mississippi Valley Generating Co. v. United States, 364 U.S. 520 (1961), in which the
Court found a contractual remedy for the United States in a statute that was silent on
the point.
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an improper alienation of public property rights in the weather with-
out concomitantly adequate protection of the social interest? With
regard to commercial weather modifiers actively seeking to modify
weather for a single client's interest, it would be difficult under public
trust theory to see an adequate justification for granting a govern-
mental license where it can be shown that the modifying activity is
objectionable to others. The modifying party and approving agency
normally could not show that they are not interfering with the
common use and enjoyment of the weather by others. A properly
cautious attitude toward environmental alteration would seem to
dictate that the proponent of the alteration, such as a commercial
modifier, bear the burden of proof in license proceedings that its
actions will not harm others."° The modifier is the proponent of the
action and will normally occupy, or should occupy, a position of
superior knowledge concerning the technology and science in question.
The question becomes more difficult when a proposal for scientific
experimentation is tested in the light of the public trust theory. The
claim of the experimenter would presumably be accorded a higher
value than that of the commercial modifier, particularly if the experi-
ment is a broadly-based attempt to secure as much knowledge as
possible and is surrounded by proper safeguards.
B. Legislation and Administrative Responsibility
A major consideration will be that most large experiments will
be supported by federal funding through the direct action of a federal
agency or through a federal grant or contract. Where this happens,
any attempt by the states to regulate modification might run afoul of
traditional considerations of federal supremacy."' There can be no
question that in supporting modification experimentation, federal
agencies should assume a large measure of responsibility for conduct-
ing a proper experiment and for maintaining a reasonable balance
between the value of a successful experiment and the risks involved.
106 Colorado seems to have taken a step in this direction by requiring that the
license applications demonstrate "skill and experience reasonably necessary to the ac-
complishment of the weather control without actionable injury to property or person."
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. f 151-1-6 (1963). Other states have established more limited re-
quirements for licenses such as a showing of past experience, scientific qualifications, and
the area and timing of proposed operations. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-2403
(1956); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.311 (1970 Supp.).
107
 Federal contractors have been held immune from state licensing statutes, Leslie
Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956); and state minimum price regulation, Paul
v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963), where such state action was found to conflict with
an explicit policy of Congress expressed by statute. Of course, there could be voluntary
consent by the federal government to its support of modification experimentation being
subject to state law.
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This should be so regardless of whether or not technical concepts of
public trust doctrine apply to the federal government.'"
In medical research, supporting federal agencies have taken the
step of subjecting proposed medical experiments to terms and condi-
tions designed to insure the safety and well-being of the subjects of
the experiments."° A similar judgment seems necessary by any fed-
eral agency approving financing for weather modification experimen-
tation. In order to exercise this judgment, such agency should first
establish some reasonable measure of the value of the experiment,
including a cost-benefit analysis where the necessary factors can be
ascertained, and including explicit articulation of unknown or un-
quantified costs or benefits that might be expected from the project.
Also, the agency should consider standards for scientific experimenta-
tion, including standards of ethics promulgated by private scientific
societies. Most important of all, in the consideration of federal sup-
port for weather modification experimentation, congressional expres-
sions in the environmental field should control.
In the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 110
 Congress
expressed policy preferences that might be difficult to reconcile with
large-scale weather modification programs. A harmony between man
and his environment, improved understanding of ecological systems,
a trusteeship for posterity, preservation of historic, cultural and
natural aspects of our national heritage, and the maintenance of an
environment supportive of diverse and individual choice, are among
the principal purposes and goals of this legislation."
Proponents of weather or climate modification programs might
well argue that their programs will actively assist in the achievement
of some or all of the above goals. However, the Congress has in effect
placed a burden of persuasion upon advocates of new programs that
might be extremely difficult to sustain. Congress has stated that if
there is substantial doubt as to the entire effect of a new program,
108
 There is a long history in federal procurement practice of subjecting the pro-
curement contract to numerous social and economic policies which are based upon
either legislative or executive policies. See generally Pearson & Whelan, Underlying
Values in Government Contracts, 10 J. of Pub. L. 298 (1961).
109
 In the ease of the National Institute of Health, individual assurances from
institutional grant recipients are required. The assurances relate to the grantee's warrant
that certain standards and procedures are observed in medical experimentation that are
designed to safeguard the rights and well being of the subjects of the experiments. In
December, 1966, the Surgeon General issued a clarifying statement regarding earlier
guidelines, and stated that the grantee institution is also responsible for complying with
the laws of the community in which the experimentation takes place. Curran, Govern-
mental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach
of Two Federal Agencies, 98 Daedalus 542, 577 (1969).
3.10 P.L. 91-190 (1970), 83 Stat. 852.
111 Id.
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then, at the very least, the proponents should report that fact. Specifi-
cally, the proponents in federal agencies of "legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" shall include in their legislative recommendations or
reports a statement on unavoidable adverse environmental impacts,
alternatives to the proposal, the relationship between long and short-
term considerations, and any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources involved if the proposal is supported."' It is clear
that many modification attempts will significantly affect the environ-
ment, and that all of these factors will have to be reported. If these
factors are presently unknowable, then it would seem a clear implica-
tion of this legislation that this must be so stated. Of course, a great
deal will depend on the manner in which this Act is interpreted and
administered. If it is subject to reasonable interpretation, it is possible
that certain of its provisions, such as the requirement for a report on
possible irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources,
might be sufficient to delay or postpone indefinitely many questionable
technological applications and programs.
C. The Value and Limitation of Cost -Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is increasingly regarded as a useful tool for
the examination of government programs," 8 and should assist in
resolution of some issues of weather modification. It merits atten-
tion with regard to questions raised by the legislation discussed above
and the ethical requirements discussed below.
One of the most obvious benefits that might flow from successful
weather modification efforts would be the elimination of some of the
destructive effects of weather. Estimates of the cost of annual weather
destruction in the United States are quite high,114
 and substantial
reduction of such losses might be obtained through weather modifi-
cation. Thus, it has been estimated that annual losses from hurricanes
might be reduced by as much as one-third by only modest reductions
in storm intensity or slight changes in storm paths. Similar cost-bene-
fit estimates have been made by a West Coast utility with respect to
rainfall enhancement upstream of its dam, and by an airline with
respect to fog dispersal.116
Although this is an inappropriate place for an extended discus-
sion of cost-benefit analysis problems, some consideration of the
112 Id. § 102, 83 Stat. 853.
113
 See, e.g., National Science Foundation, Human Dimensions of the Atmosphere
50 (192) [hereinafter cited as Human Dimensions Report].
114
 Estimated annual figures are $250 million for tornadoes, $200 million for hur-
ricanes, and $290 million for floods. Id. at 103.
115
 Special Commission Report, supra note 69, at 86-87.
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subject is valuable. Courts and legislatures have historically relied
upon evidence of the projected costs and benefits of proposed deci-
sions, and improvement of these processes of forecasting is worth
study. Often, in the case of courts, cost-benefit analysis has been a
crude and intuitive process that is easiest to adopt in a novel situation
such as that posed in a dispute over weather modification. Also it might
appear in nuisance cases in an examination of the relative hardships to
the plaintiff and defendant in deciding whether to abate an alleged
nuisance.'" For the problem of weather modification, cost-benefit
analysis might attempt to assess the value of natural weather in a
given area through a determination of what losses would occur to every
interest in the area as a result of a given modification. All of these losses
would have to be added to the direct costs of the modification project
in order to arrive at an approximation of the true cost of the effort.'
In the Slutsky case,'" it was shown that the New York court
balanced the benefits presumed to flow from the defendant's activity
to the millions living in the city against the possibility of loss to the
resort owner and his guests. It is quite easy, by means of a compara-
tive examination of the numbers of people involved and of the respec-
tive interests claimed by the competing parties (rain for life, as
opposed to clear weather for a resort owner), to decide that the claim
of the proponent of weather modification should prevail. Indeed, this
may have been the proper resolution of the Slutsky case. The point
raised here is that the New York court appeared not to consider the
difficult and, under present knowledge and technology, probably un-
known factor of indirect and long-term costs of the modification effort.
Cost-benefit analysis, aided by greatly increased scientific knowledge,
and competent trial counsel, could remedy this lack of thorough analy-
sis in cases such as Slutsky.
In the case of hurricane diversion, the reduction of a substantial
annual loss from storm destruction by a factor of one-third is likely
to be very persuasive in any dispute over the possible merits of a
hurricane seeding program. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider
the sense in which loss from hurricanes, or any form of extreme
118
 Restatement of Torts § 827-28 (1938).
117 Such an analysis might illustrate a larger category of problems in the law and
political processes—that of the rational balancing of competing interests. See generally
Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943), and a critical discus-
sion of the difficulty of quantifying interests in 3. Stone, The Province and Function of
Law 361-64 (1950). Pound himself came to the feeling that the quest for an unvarying
method of balancing given social interests was futile. See 3 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 100
(1959). In the event of a conflict between competing interests, one of which could be
the protection of a natural resource, the best that could be hoped for was a reasoned
choice. See Patterson, Some Reflections on Sociological Jurisprudence, 44 Va. L. Rev.
395 (1958).
118
 197 Misc. 730, 97 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
532
WEATHER MODIFICATION: POLICY AND LAW
weather, is caused by the weather itself. It has been argued that the
relationship between the damaged property and the agent causing the
damage is reciprocal, and that the so-called agent of the injury, such
as a hurricane, is in no sense principally or solely responsible for the
injury.'" Many forms of weather are subject to fairly accurate long-
term prediction, and the damaged property or injured person, by being
in the storm's path, is as much responsible for the injury as is the
storm. Thus, persons who knowingly build homes or businesses on flood
or coastal plains, where it is known that serious flooding or destruction
will occur periodically, seemingly accept the flood risk. The same is true
of persons who construct in coastal areas known to be exposed to
periodic hurricane danger.
These considerations demonstrate the necessity for the close
consideration of alternatives to storm diversion activities. Improved
construction, design and siting of buildings, 120 more public expenditure
for weather forecasting, and the planning of cities to avoid known na-
tural threats such as periodic hurricanes and flooding, all seem possible
alternatives to weather modification. These alternatives must be con-
sidered when the direct value of weather modification proposals is in
question, and the total cost of the proposal must be established to the
best extent possible.
It is not unusual for analyses such as those used to arrive at
potential savings through hurricane diversion to ignore the potential
indirect effects of the proposal under consideration. Often this occurs
because such effects are unknown. Thus, the analyses might be limited
to direct effects on target areas and to the direct financial cost to the
client ordering the modification.
Current thinking regarding economic analysis of the side effects
of productive activity would compensate for this lack. Such analysis
of indirect effects refers to them as "externalities," and argues for
proper recompense for these where harmful and where they can be
identified.12' Because it is not always possible to identify external or in-
direct effects, it is often quite convenient for proponents of new tech-
nology to rely on such a state of affairs as a reason for proceeding with
their program without attempting to account fully for its costs. Such an
119 See generally J. Stockfisch, External Economies & Diseconomies, International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 269-70 (1968).
120
 Some construction practices in coastal areas in the eastern United States are
regarded as highly improper uses of Iand. An extensive storm in 1962 destroyed many
coastal homes in New Jersey. Many homes were spared, however, where the natural
protection of coastal dunes had not been destroyed by man through the destruction of
dune grasses and breaching of the dune itself. See I. McHarg, Design With Nature . 17
(1969).
121 J. Stockfish, supra note 119, at 269-70.
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attitude effectively ignores the side effects of the proposed techno-
logical intervention.
The law is often unable to cope with the problem of indirect
effects, and, on occasion, dismisses them as damnum absque injuria. 122
The propensity of courts to require direct proof concerning quantifi-
able values is understandable because of the requirement of giving
judgments in exact monetary terms. The use of evidence concerning
easily quantifiable values, such as loss of profits, is easier for judges
and juries because it provides seemingly exacting standards for deci-
sion, and frees the trier of fact from the difficult task of judging
intangibles. It is nevertheless clear that the weighing of intangible
and unquantifiable values will soon become more necessary. As already
noted, there are limited signs that courts are willing to assume this
task. In the well known Scenic Hudson case, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit required the Federal Power Commission to give
consideration to matters of scenery, beauty and wildlife in connection
with a challenge of a power construction project.' 23 Although this
case was based in large part on the legislative history of the Federal
Power Act, the Supreme Court has already referred to it favorably,
and without any such limitation.' 24
In the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Congress
addressed itself to the problem of protection of unquantifiable values
in a somewhat oblique manner by directing that "all agencies of the
Federal Government shall . . . identify and develop methods and pro-
cedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environ-
mental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration
in decision making along with economic and technical considera-
tions." 125 Moreover, it is clear that in other sections of this legisla-
tion the Congress established general policies that will necessitate the
protection of numerous explicitly designated values "such as estheti-
cally . . . pleasing surroundings," that are not subject to quantifica-
tion.'"
This emphasizes important limitations on cost-benefit analysis.
It is clear that litigation and questions of legislative policy in the
122 See Davis, State Regulation of Weather Modification, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 35, 48
(1970).
123 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
124 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 US. 150
(1970). Resistance to the thinking in Scenic Hudson has already manifested itself, cf.
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 39 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971), in which the court denied standing
to a conservation group in a challenge to recreational and commercial construction in a
national park. The Data Processing opinion was limited as dealing with litigation by a
"competitor",
125 P.L. 91-190 § 102(2)(B) (1970), 83 Stat. 853.
125 Id. I 101(b), 83 Stat. 852.
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field of weather modification, as well as in many other areas, will often
involve issues of rights or values so superior or compelling that cost-
benefit analysis of the question would be not only unnecessary but
dangerous because it would involve the suggestion that the right or
value in question is subject to quantification and impairment or de-
struction for a price. As was suggested earlier, some modification
results conceivably would set in motion irreversible changes in society
or would impair the biotic potential of numerous animal or plant
species. Such changes could not be compensated for or repaired by
any means known to man.
D. The Role of Private Societies
The ethical question of most importance posed for proponents of
weather modification is the extent to which they are willing to accept
responsibility for the results of their efforts. In large part, the diffi-
culties that have been caused by science and technology stem from an
inability on the part of society to perceive the consequence of the
chain of events initiated by new techniques. Presumably, those with
deeper perception and broader understanding of weather processes
are better able to anticipate some of the results of weather modifica-
tion programs, or are better able to perceive where anticipation of
results is impossible. Because of this they bear a heavier responsibility
in their advocacy of weather modification. The problem thus might
become one of introducing weather scientists into a law-making role
in the best possible manner. This is a type of concern that has been
the subject of a great amount of discussion in the period since the end
of World War II, and there is no need to expand on the proposal for
scientific advisory bodies to be established at differing levels of gov-
ernment.' With regard to weather modification control; the inevitable
proposal for the creation of a special administrative agency for this
purpose has been made.128 It is quite possible that, in due course,
such an agency will be formed, but the numerous difficulties and
limitations of present administrative agencies must not be overlooked
in considering such proposals."°
There is no assurance that a newly-established agency charged
121 See, e.g., C. Snow, Science and Government (1960); Price, The Scientific Estab-
lishment, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 713 (1963); D. Price, Government and Science (1962).
128 Corbridge & Moses, Weather Modification: Law and Administration, 8 Nat. Res.
f. 207, 226 (1968).
1" Rexford Tugwell has argued that the failure of federal regulatory agencies stems
in part from the fact that the agencies are extra-constitutional. He would remedy this
In his proposed constitution by explicitly bringing them into the basic law and by sub-
jecting their activities to the supervisory powers of a "watchkeeper." See The Constitu-
tion for a United Republics of America; A Model for Discussion, 3 Center Magazine 37,
58 (1970).
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with administration of the weather would not, in time, align itself
with business and scientific groups who maintain professional en-
thusiasm for the exploitation of the very medium the agency is
supposed to protect.'" There is need for a constant vigil over environ-
mental matters, even absent weather modification. It is questionable
whether any governmental regulatory agency for weather modification
control could long maintain the sense of purpose and vigor that would
be needed to contest the numerous challenges it would face. Thus,
along with the establishment of an administrative agency, there should
be examined the question of measures that would act to check, spur
or supplement the role of the agency as circumstances require.
Although it is somewhat conjectural, there might be a considerable
part to play in the government of weather control matters for private
scientific societies, such as the American Meteorological Society.
While it is virtually impossible to demonstrate empirically that a
practical delegation of government authority to a private society
would be a valuable supplement to the authority of a public adminis-
trative body, there would probably be much to commend such a step.
It is likely that a private society would be able to retain the best
talent in the field, if only for part-time work. Although federal per-
sonnel policy and salaries have been liberalized in recent years, it is
probably true that career choices of individual scientists tend to favor
the private sector."' If the talent is effectively employed, a private
non-profit society might be better able to maintain the necessary
vigor in the scrutiny of the technology practiced by its members and,
more importantly, the society could bring to the matter the capacity
to perceive, as far as possible, the potential long-term benefits and
costs of particular modification attempts. Whether such a society
would possess the necessary sense of detachment and commitment to
the broader interests of society is not as clear. Recently there has
been some interest on the part of scientific societies in the United
States regarding the question of the development of ethical standards
for members, including the development of written codes.'" The
American Meteorological Society has addressed itself in somewhat
general terms in its by-laws to questions arising from relationships
between the meteorologist and the general public. The meteorologist
is directed to base his practice "on sound scientific principles," and
180 G. Kennon, To Prevent a World Wasteland, 48 Foreign Affairs 401 (1970). In
connection with domestic administrative agencies it has been pointed out that much
recent environmental litigation has been conducted by citizens against the very govern-
mental agencies charged with protection of the public interest.
181 D. Price, Government and Science 76-77 (1962).
131 Coffin, Congress Loses Its Sacred Powers, 23 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
35 (1967).
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to avoid "practices generally recognized as being detrimental to or
incompatible with the general public welfare."'"
The ethical problem of whether a proposal for weather modifica-
tion should be supported is not clearly soluble by reference to the
code of the society. The code appears to be principally concerned
with ethical standards with respect to private forecasting services,
and weather modification is not mentioned. In its general statement
that the practice of the meteorologist shall be based on "sound
scientific principles," the code creates the familiar problem of finding
meaning for general terms in particular instances.
Thus, considerable effort has been expended to anticipate the
problems of weather modification, and these attempts reveal that very
little is known about what results large-scale modification would
produce. From this it would seem to follow that modification experi-
mentation should be temporarily prohibited. On the national scale,
however, the recommendations in reports published by the National
Science Foundation seem to urge further modification experimenta-
tion with parallel research in other fields to learn of the effects of
actual modification. An appropriate standard for modification research,
• therefore, might be to permit modification experimentation only in
cases where simultaneous investigation effects on humans, animals and
plants is conducted. This would apply with particular force where
large numbers of people might be affected by particular experiments,
or where any number of people might be subject to sustained modifica-
tions of weather.
In considering medical experimentation and the problems it poses
for the experimenter, Margaret Mead has pointed to the model of
anthropological field work in which the investigator seeks to enlist
the participation of members of the society under investigation. Since
the members are the equal of the investigator, the relationship is one
of collaborators and not that of experimenter and subject. Professor
Mead regards the more traditional model of research on human
beings with repugnance, with the subject being seen as a victim and
the experimenter as brutalized."' This might be very similar to the
public perception of weather modification experimentation and opera-
tion in some cases. However, a model modification experiment might
include within its protocol steps to enlist the participation of indi-
viduals or groups in the study of the human dimensions of the experi-
ment. Thus, a fundamental change would occur in relationships be-
tween the researchers and the persons likely to be affected. Both
188 American Meteorological Society Code of Ethics, art. VIII(C) (1969).
134 Mead, Research with Human Beings: A Model Derived from Anthropological
Field Practice, 98 Daedalus 361, 374 (1969).
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researchers and members of the public woud gain some benefits from
such an arrangement. The procedure would necessarily involve secur-
ing the voluntary cooperation of groups likely to file suit, a step that
is vastly preferable to the proposed alternatives of proceeding against
the will of affected communities and relying on a government-funded
indemnification program to insulate the experiment from community
objection. The procedure would afford the community to be affected
by the experiment with timely notice of the proposed experiment, and
the sponsors of the experiment would be in a position to determine
potential long-term dangers in their work at the earliest time.
It is conceivable that private scientific societies concerned with
weather modification could assist materially in the development of
standards, such as those discussed above, for modification experimenta-
tion. This could occur through the deliberate and quasi-legislative
development of codes of ethics or similar formal developments. It
could also derive informally through the development of a standard of
custom or usage, although this is not likely in the near future.'" As
in the case of the by-laws of the American Meteorological Society,
such codes could be addressed directly to the relationship of the
scientist or the technologist with the public. To the extent this is so,
individuals claiming injury through breach of the code provisions
might qualify as third party beneficiaries of the contract between the
society and its members."° In other situations, the codes could be held
enforceable by the society directly against an errant member, as is
often the case with by-laws of an association or a corporation.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of public policy with regard to science and
technology is in a high state of flux. There is an intense public aware-
ness of both the value of science and technology and the potential
danger in thoughtless scientific and technological applications. Because
of the widespread consciousness of environmental problems, however,
it seems likely that some form of greater institutional control of tech-
nology might come to pass in the near future."'
lad Courts are reluctant to make judgments in scientific matters, and it is probably
fair to say that there often is simply no evidence regarding custom or usage in some
scientific matters. In Seaboard v. Crowther, Nos. 1702, 1712 (D.C. Colo., March 16,
1970), the court rejected a public interest group's challenge to the proposed detonation
of an underground atomic bomb partly because the issues involved a "scientific con-
troversy of great sophistication" that the court could not evaluate.
laa See Corbin's discussion of the donee third party beneficiary theory. 4 A. Corbin,
Contracts f 782 (1951).
I" See, e.g., Kelley v. Weiss, 328 Mass. 197, 102 N.E.2d 93 (1951); Boston Club
v. Potter, 212 Mass. 23, 98 N.E. 614 (1912).
138
 Wheeler has proposed a public corporation for the control of "developmental
science," i.e., that which is almost immediately converted into technology. This corpo-
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Numerous questions are posed by the development of weather
modification technology, and one of the most important is created by
the conjunction of this technology with extensive federal support and
administration. Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
eroded considerably, it is still possible for federally supported actions
to be immune from effective impediment even though serious environ-
mental issues might be created by the federal action.' There appear
to be adequate bases for agencies sponsoring weather modification
research or operations to insist that attention be paid to the ecological
and human dimensions of weather modification. Otherwise modifica-
tion efforts might result in litigation leading to a judicial expression of
constitutionally based environmental rights. The Ninth Amendment
might prove to be well suited to such an effort."°
Weather modification problems should also be examined at a level
other than that of litigation which, after all, results only from a break-
down in society's mechanisms for harmonious functioning. There
should be more critical examination of the intensity with which new
scientific ideas are promoted for publication or testing, particularly
where government sponsorship is present."' This is especially neces-
sary where immediate technological application is planned.
An ethic of self-restraint in the application of new knowledge
might well supplement the ethic of boundless accumulation and pub-
lication of new knowledge. The microbiologist Rene Dubos has become
a leading spokesman for the cause of environmental awareness, and
some of his views seem quite appropriate to these problems. He has
written movingly about the biological inheritance of man and the
limitations that this has placed on his ability to adapt to the modern
ration would have certain traditional features familiar to lawyers that would provide
for a system of adjudication of disputes and the hearing and processing of public
complaints regarding science. It would also have quasi-legislative organs and functions
for the initiation and planning of scientific projects that would take into account both
scientific and "civilian" viewpoints. Wheeler, Bringing Science Under Law, 2 Center
Magazine 59, 65 (1969).
la° Cf. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). This case involved a project of the
Bureau of Reclamation involving major redistribution of water between natural basins
which decreased natural water flow in some streams. It was held that the activity was
Immune from interference by injunction on the ground of sovereign immunity.
140 See generally Kent, Rights Retained by the People Under the Ninth Amend-
ment, 29 Fed. Bar. J. 219, 228-32 (1970).
141 Officio.' federal policy regarding patents developed with federal financial support
is based on the premise that "the Government has a responsibility to foster the fullest
exploitation of the inventions for the public benefit." The explicit policy is that the
patents "and the technological advances covered thereby" shall be available and "brought
into being in the shortest time possible." President's Memo of Oct. 10, 1963, 3 C.F.R.
861,864 (1959-63 compilation). This policy statement is apparently innocent of any
consideration that the technological development covered by patents may be the source
of considerable social disruption. The policy simply assumes that the invention and
development necessarily constitute an "advance" and should be exploited immediately.
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conditions of a life that has been determined by science and tech-
nology."' He maintains that living beings can survive as individuals
and species only by continuously interacting with their environment
and thereby modifying some aspect of their own being. Thus, he
seems to raise the crucial question of whether man can long survive in
an increasingly artificial environment.
Self-restraint in technology application would not be revolution-
ary. Although Leonardo da Vinci's sketches and designs for military
machines are familiar, Leonardo did not intend his notebooks for pub-
lication, and he sought to prohibit the release of his ideas for a sub-
marine because be recognized its potential for evil.'" This attitude
of da Vinci, it has been said, was consistent with a tradition that the
results of scientific thought were not to be reduced to practical affairs,
and, in particular, were not to be used for destructive purposes."'
These statements oversimplify complex historical phenomena, 146 but
an attitude of restraint did exist and it is instructive for present pur-
poses to note it.
To attempt a mass return to this state of mind, such as through
prohibition of scientific application by government fiat is almost in-
conceivable. It does seem necessary, however, that those areas of
science having potential for immediate public impact, such as the
proposals for weather modification, should be subject to selective con-
trols for the public good. These controls will be determined by public
methods, but there is an opportunity for concerned private societies
and individuals to address themselves to the development of standards
for their own work. Although there are risks in the slowing of tech-
nological application, the risks in a continuation of a doctrine of
laissez faire technology seem incomparably greater.
142 R. Dubos, So Human an Animal (1968).
148 A. Nef, Western Civilization Since The Renaissance: Peace, War, Industry and
the Arts 48, 118 (1963).
144 Id. at 117-25.
145
 Just as not every contemporary scientist or technologist is driven to immediate
application of new concepts, not every ancient or medieval thinker would resist applica-
tion of his ideas where compelling reasons were present. A just defense of one's homeland
probably has been the best known justification for practical application of scientific
knowledge from the time of Archimedes' assistance in the defense of Syracuse against
Roman invasion, to the work of the western atomic scientists in World War II.
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